Celebritys Rights to Privacy

Celebritys Rights to concealmentDo celebrities have offices to privacy? Should their private lives be open to tender scrutiny? Please analyse howdy v Douglas, Campbell v MGN Ltd, A v B and Campbell v Frisbee. Please also mention cases that were referred to in the judgements of these cases, and the vastness of data protection in answer this question. in that location is no express common law tort of privacy in English law1. Rather, there is a generally recognised right to privacy. In recent times, there has been much controversy surrounding the issue of privacy, and questions have been raised as to whether or not privacy should be expressly enforceable through the solicits. Prior to the HRA 1998, a person could only bring an action against another for offend of confidence, trespass or defamation2.Grundberg3 opines, Freedom of the press is the cornerstone of independence of speech. However, it is the media that have had the biggest role to play in the discussions surrounding the right to privacy. Gibbons suggests that the issue now is deciding how far the intimacys of the media count against the introduction of a general law. He opines that the concept of privacy is not easy to elucidate and its priority in securing protection over other interests is not self-evident.4 Essentially, Gibbons affirms, privacy centres on the individuals right to restrict the availability of development about him or herself.There have been attempts to pass bills in Parliament with the aim of introducing a statutory tort of privacy, all of which were unsuccessful. Government Committees and Royal Commissions have also recommended against the introduction of such a law on the basis that there would be an unworkable explanation of the tort.5 The Younger Committee Report on silence confirmed that they found privacy to be a concept which means all-encompassingly divergent things to different people and changes significantly over relatively short periods. In considering how the courts could handle so ill-defined and unstable a concept, we conclude that privacy is ill-suited to be the emergence of long process of definition through the building up of precedents over the years, since the judgements of the past would be an unreliable guide to any current evaluation of privacy.6 The absence seizure of such a law was criticised in the case of Kaye v Robertson.7 Gordon Kaye, an actor, had been involved in a serious accident and was consequently admitted to hospital. Journalists from the Sun sidereal day Sport snub notices to see a member of staff before visiting Kaye, and subsequently took photographs of him. Medical evidence was submitted, stating that Kaye was not fit to give interviews at that time and had no recollection of ever giving one in the first place. Consequently, Potter, J granted an injunction to prevent publication of the pictures and any accompanying story. Barendt and Hitchens assert that this incident case has been the subject of much a nalysis in recent times, and cite Professor Markesinis8 who claimed that, English law, on the w trap, compares unfavourably with German lawMany aspects of the military personnel personality and privacy are protected by a multitude of existing torts but this means fitting the accompaniments of each case in the pigeon hole of an existing tortit may leave a deserving plaintiff without a remedy.9In October 2000, an express right to privacy finally broke into English law by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998. The European normal on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 8 was incorporated into English law. The Convention stipulates that Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.According to Grundberg, the HRA 1998 applies only to government action and not to the actions of private individuals. Furthermore, Article 8 requirements can conflict with the right to freedom of expression, as detailed in Article 10.10In Douglas v Hello, the Douglases and OK Magazine won their case against the publishers of Hello clipping for happy chance of confidence. Hello had published unauthorised photographs of the wedding of Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta Jones, in the full knowledge that OK had an exclusive on the story. In addition to winning their claim for breach of confidence however, the Douglases were also awarded damages under the information tax shelter Act 1998 by virtue of the fact that the photographs were deemed to be personal data.11 The photographs were said to have been unlawfully processed by Hello, thereby contravening the requirements of the DPA 1998. Lindsay, J stated that, When a data controller (Hello) is responsible for the publication of hard copies that reproduce data that has previously been processed by means of equipment operating automatically, the publication forms part of the process and falls within the scope of the Act.12 Hello argued that their publication fell within the wi de journalism exception under s.32 of the DPA 1998, a mechanism that was successfully used against Naomi Campbell in the case of Campbell v MGN Ltd13 at the Court of Appeal. In this case however, Lindsay, J ruled that unlike the Campbell case, there was no credible evidence that Hello had the necessary belief that the publication was in the public interest, particularly given that the photographs were obtained by trespassing paparazzo and Hello knew OK was about to publish a wedding exclusive.14 He continued to assert, That the public would be interested is not to be dislocated with their being a public interest.Kate Brimsted claims that the first principle of the DPA 1998 requires the processing of data to be fair and lawful. In this case, Lindsay, J held that the principle had been breached by Hello magazine in that their methods of obtaining the photographs were unfair. The magazine had also failed to comply with the requirements laid out in Schedule 2 of the Act in relation to fair and lawful processing. In the case of Hello v Douglas Lindsay, J referred to the case of down v UK15. In this case, the European Court of Human Rights held that English law had failed to provide visual sense with an effective domestic remedy when CCTV images of him looking apparently suicidal were broadcast. Brimsted argues that in the current climate, the DPA 1998 would provide him with a legal remedy by virtue of the fact that he would be entitled to compensation as he suffered by reason of any contravention of the Act by the data controller (the broadcaster).In the case of Campbell v MGN Ltd16 the Mirror newspaper had ran a cover story with the headline Naomi I am a Drug Addict, accompanied by twain pictures one of Naomi Campbell as a glamorous model, the other of her looking casual in jeans and a baseball cap, over the caption Therapy Naomi outside meeting. The Mirror had open(a) Naomi Campbells attendance at Narcotics Anonymous. In general, the article was deemed to b e supportive and sympathetic, though inaccurate in places. The frequency of her attendance was also exaggerated.Campbell took action against MGN Ltd the day the story was published. The Mirror responded by publishing further stories, though the tone of the articles shifted from sympathetic and supportive to aggressive and demeaning one headline was simply labeled Pathetic. In the proceedings, Campbell claimed damages for breach of confidence, and compensation under the Data Protection Act 1998. Morland, J upheld her claim, awarding her approximately 3,500. MGN Ltd subsequently appealed, and this was upheld. Campbell appealed once again to the House of Lords, though this time her appeal was dismissed on the basis that inter alia, the pictures published by MGN Ltd conveyed no private information beyond that discussed in the articlethere was nothing undignified or distrait about her appearance.17 It is worth noting here the difference between this case and Peck v UK, where Pecks vulner able and suicidal appearance was a key factor in the final decision.Naomi Campbell was involved in further legal proceedings against her agent employee Vanessa Frisbee, in Campbell v Frisbee.18 The stark nakeds of the World had published an article about apparent sexual encounters between Campbell and the actor Joseph Fiennes. The story had been provided to the newspaper by Vanessa Frisbee, who had been employed by Campbell to provide management services. It was a term of Frisbees contract that she would keep information about Campbell private, and she entered into a Confidentiality system on the 9th February 2000. Frisbee agreed to abide by a number of clauses namely however that she would not disclose anything to the media without the prior permission of Campbell. It was appreciated in court that Frisbee owed Campbell a duty of confidence, and that the disclosures she had made were clearly a breach of this confidence. Campbell claimed damages or account of profits arising from the breach of confidence. By way of defence, Frisbee argued that, through a culmination of mistreatment and assault the contract between herself and Campbell had been repudiated, and, even if the court found that this was not the case, she was entitled to sell the story nevertheless, because there was a public interest.Lightman, J held in this case that confidentiality remained binding in respect of confidential information that the employee or contractor had acquired in the course of his or her service, even if the contract had been repudiated by other means19.In the case of A v B, the court was concerned with whether or not to grant an injunction to restrain the publication of private information. This information concerned the sexual relations that A, a married professional footballer, had had with two women C and D. Lord Woolf stated in this case that any interference with the press had to be justified under s.12 (4) of the Human Rights Act, the court had to have regard to whet her or not it would be in the public interest for material to be published. Lord Woolf stressed in this case however that, even if there were no obvious special public interest, this did not mean that the court would be justified in interfering with the freedom of the press he opined that, where an individual was a public figure he was entitled to have his privacy respected in appropriate circumstances. He should recognise however that he must expect and accept that his actions would be more closely scrutinised by the media.20 Lord Woolf appears to be adhering to the school of thought that suggests celebrities, by virtue of their prominent status within society, should appreciate that their lifestyles and activities will be more carefully monitored by the press than quotidian members of the public.Crone suggests that it is unlikely a claimant will be able to restrain the publication of information about his or her private life unless the information is futile or already in the pu blic domainthere is a clear public interest in the publication involving, for example, the detection or scene of crimesor the claimant can clearly be compensated in damages because, for example, he is prepared to sell the relevant information about his private life, as was the case in Douglas v Hello.21In answering the question, Should the lives of celebrities be open to press scrutiny, the difficulty lies in deciding which information is of sufficient importance for the public to have a justifiable claim to knowing about it. Gibbons claims that in some cases this is reasonably clear, i.e. if facts about anti-social or harmful practices are private, this does not warrant their continued secrecy, and facts relevant to a politicians ability to govern are required to be publicly known in the interest of society at large. It appears that celebrities are entitled to object if information is private and there is no public interest in the material being published. There are obvious differ ences between cases such as Campbell v MGN Ltd, where the claimant did not wish the photographs to be published at all, and Douglas v Hello, where there objections stem from the fact that, while they were willing for photographs to be published, they had agreed an exclusive with a magazine in order to protect their commercial interests. It is also interesting to tone that now, while the UK does not benefit from a specific privacy law, adequate redress can now be obtained by virtue of the Data Protection Act 1998, and the protection it offers by reason of any contravention of its provisions.BibliographyBarendt, E., Hitchens, L. Media impartiality Cases and Materials (2000) London Longman Law SeriesBrimsted, Kate for Hebert Smith Data Protection a solitude Law By Any another(prenominal) constitute? 15th April 2003 www.spr-consilio.comCrone, T. Law and the Media (4th Edition) 2002 Oxford Focal PressGibbons, T Regualating the Media (1998) London Sweet maxwellCASE impartialityA v B Plc Another (2003) QB 195Campbell v Frisbee (2002) EWCA Civ nary(prenominal) 1374Campbell v MGN Ltd (2002)Kaye v Robertson (1991) FSR 62Peck v UK (The Times, 3rd February 2003)STATUTORY PROVISIONSData Protection Act 1998Human Rights Act 1998LEGAL WEBSITESwww.spr-consilio.comwww.hmcourts-service.gov.ukFootnotes1 Grundberg, P. The New Right to Privacy Chapter 8, p.114-130 in Crone, T. Law and the Media (4th Edition) 2002 Oxford Focal Press2 Grundberg, P. The New Right to Privacy Chapter 8, p.114-130 in Crone, T. Law and the Media (4th Edition) 2002 Oxford Focal Press3 Grundberg, P. The New Right to Privacy Chapter 8, p.114-130 in Crone, T. Law and the Media (4th Edition) 2002 Oxford Focal Press4 Gibbons, T Regualating the Media (1998) London Sweet Maxwell p.835 Grundberg, P. The New Right to Privacy Chapter 8, p.114-130 in Crone, T. Law and the Media (4th Edition) 2002 Oxford Focal Press6 Younger Committee Report on Privacy, Cmnd. 5012 (1972) cited in Barendt, E., Hitchens, L. M edia Law Cases and Materials (2000) London Longman Law Series p.3997 Kaye v Robertson (1991) FSR 628 The German Law of Torts (2nd Edition) 1990 p.316 cited in Barendt, E., Hitchens, L. Media Law Cases and Materials (2000) London Longman Law Series p.3999 Barendt, E., Hitchens, L. Media Law Cases and Materials (2000) London Longman Law Series p.39910 Grundberg, P. The New Right to Privacy Chapter 8, p.114-130 in Crone, T. Law and the Media (4th Edition) 2002 Oxford Focal Press11 Brimsted, Kate for Hebert Smith Data Protection a Privacy Law By Any early(a) Name? 15th April 2003 www.spr-consilio.com12 Lindsay, J Douglas v Hello Cited in Kate Brimsted for Hebert Smith Data Protection a Privacy Law By Any Other Name? 15th April 2003 www.spr-consilio.com13 Campbell v MGN Ltd (2002)14 Lindsay, J cited in Hebert Smith Data Protection a Privacy Law By Any Other Name? 15th April 2003 www.spr-consilio.com15 Peck v UK (The Times, 3rd February 2003) cited by Lindsay, J in Douglas v Hello, cite d in Brimsted, Kate for Hebert Smith Data Protection a Privacy Law By Any Other Name? 15th April 2003 www.spr-consilio.com16 Campbell v MGN Ltd (2004) UKHL 2217 Campbell v MGN Ltd (2004) UKHL 2218 Campbell v Frisbee (2002) EWCA Civ No. 137419 Lightman, J Campbell v Frisbee (2002) EWCA Civ No. 137420 A v B Plc Another (2003) QB 19521 Crone, T. Law and the Media (4th Edition) (2002) Oxford Focal Press